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Abstract
When an accident occurs which results in injuries or property
damage an investigation is usually conducted within a short period of
time to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties involved.
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When an accident occurs which results in injuries or property
damage an investigation is usually conducted within a short period of
time to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties involved. De-
pending on the magnitude of the harm, the likelihood that some legal
action will be taken by one of the parties is high. Many businesses,
aware of this potential, often conduct in-house investigations of acci-
dents involving their employees or occuring on their premises to deter-
mine the cause and prevent recurrences. Once an action is ultimately
filed, one of the questions which frequently arises is whether a party
may obtain witness statements and reports gathered by the adverse
party during its preliminary investigations.
Section 1.280(b)(2) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure' pro-
vides that "documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of
litigation" are considered work product, and are therefore protected
from discovery.2 Unfortunately, the phrase "prepared in anticipation of
1. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(2) states in part:
Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision
(b)(3) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangi-
ble things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or trial by or for an-
other party or by or for that party's representative, including his attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer or agent, only upon a showing that
the party seeking discovery has need of the materials in the preparation of
his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the sub-
stantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery
of the materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions
or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concern-
ing the litigation.
2. The protection from discovery is not absolute. Once a showing has been made
by the party resisting discovery that the materials were prepared in anticipation of
litigation, the burden then shifts to the party seeking discovery to show that there is
substantial need for the material, and that the substantial equivalent cannot be ob-
tained without undue hardship. If this showing is established, production will be or-
dered. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(2).
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litigation" has created considerable confusion among Florida's courts.3
Some cases are in direct conflict with each other, while others simply
lack clarity.
Despite this continued confusion, the Supreme Court of Florida
has yet to interpret Rule 1.280(b)(2). Therefore, the only source of
guidance has been conflicting decisions from the state's district courts
of appeal and the federal courts.4 Some courts have held that since not
all accidents lead to litigation, an investigation following an occurrence
is not necessarily prepared in anticipation of litigation.5 These cases
look at the facts of the case before determining whether to accord the
material "work product" protection. However, other courts have held
that all statements and information secured after an occurrence which
might give rise to a claim are prepared in anticipation of litigation.6
The result is a split among Florida courts.
This Note will focus on Florida's application of work product pro-
tection to materials prepared before litigation commenced. First, it will
examine the history and development of the protection afforded trial
preparation materials, which is essential for an understanding of the
policies underlying the protection from discovery provided by Rule
1.280(b)(2). Second, it will discuss the applicable case law in Florida,
focusing on the inconsistencies and confusion among the district courts
of appeal in applying the work product rule to trial preparation materi-
als. Third, there will be an analysis of the decisions addressing this
issue in federal court and the highest courts of other states. Next, this
3. Brown v. Superior Court in and For Maricopa Cy., 137 Ariz. 327, 333, 670
P.2d 725, 732 (1983).
4. The Florida courts have relied to some extent on Florida decisions interpreting
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) since FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(2) was amended to conform to
the federal rule. See Cotton States Mutual Ins. Co. v. Turtle Reef Assocs., 444 So. 2d
595, 596 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
5. E.g., Airocar, Inc. v. Goldman, 474 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985);
Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. White, 447 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Cot-
ton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Turtle Reef Assocs., 444 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McGann, 402 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Dixon, 330 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1976); Surette v. Galiardo, 323 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
6. E.g., Florida Cypress Gardens, Inc. v. Murphy, 471 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Gonyea, 455 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); Walt Disney World Co. v. Cotto, 462 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1984); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nakutis, 435 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1983), rev. denied, 446 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1984); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Monroe, 276
So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied 283 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1973).
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Note will suggest methods to clarify the existing confusion as to which
materials have been prepared in anticipation of litigation. The proposed
standards will require a distinction between cases brought by a third
party against a liability insurer and those which are claims by the in-
sured against its insurer. It will demonstrate that because the primary
purpose of the initial investigation conducted by a liability insurer is
different from an insurer's investigation of its insured's loss, a different
standard of discovery protection is required. As to other types of busi-
nesses which conduct investigations following accidents, this Note will
suggest that the courts take a case by case approach focusing on the
facts before determining whether materials should be accorded work
product protection. Various factors are set forth to aid the court in
making the determination. Finally, a suggestion is made that the Flor-
ida Supreme Court should adopt these standards, thereby providing a
clear precedent for the lower courts to follow. The proposed standards
will assure a proper and predictable application of work product protec-
tion throughout the state.
II. Development of the Work Product Concept
A. Pre-Hickman v. Taylor7
"The adoption in 1937 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
initiated a slow revolution in attitude toward pretrial discovery that led
to the development of a work product doctrine in the United States."8
Through the Federal Rules, discovery rather than pleadings became
the primary method for adversarial parties in a lawsuit to gather infor-
mation.9 Shortly after the enactment of the Federal Rules, district
courts often faced situations where the provisions of the Rules were
invoked by a party who wanted to prevent the production of his trial
preparation material.10 Discovery of documents was restricted under
Rule 34 unless a showing of good cause was made.11 This showing of
7. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
8. Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 760, 766
(1983).
9. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
10. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30 advisory committee note, 5 F.R.D. 433, 457-59
(1946) (proposed amendment).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 was amended in 1970. The amendment eliminated the
requirement of "good cause" and made ordinary documents routinely discoverable
upon a showing of relevance.
12991986]
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good cause for the production of all documents and things was required
whether or not trial preparation material was involved.12 However, the
courts differed as to the required showing under the "good cause"
test.13
The split in the courts led the Federal Rules Advisory Committee
to suggest changes in the Rules, which would clear up the confusion
over the proper protection to be afforded to trial preparation materi-
als.' 4 However, such changes were not adopted by the United States
Supreme Court. Instead, the court "chose to articulate the standard of
protection for work product in its forthcoming decision"' 5 of Hickman
v. Taylor.6
B. Hickman v. Taylor
Hickman v. Taylor 7 is the leading case setting the standards of
the work product concept. In Hickman, the tug "J.M. Taylor" sank
while towing a car float across the Delaware River.' 8 Five of the nine
crew members drowned.' 9 Shortly thereafter counsel for the defendant
tug owners interviewed each survivor and obtained statements from
them.20 One year later plaintiff attempted to obtain copies of the writ-
ten statements of the witnesses and copies of the memoranda of counsel
regarding the oral statements and other matters.2 The defendants re-
fused to comply claiming such reports called for "privileged matter ob-
tained in preparation of litigation."22
The issue in Hickman was to determine to what "extent . ..a
party may inquire into the oral and written statements of witnesses, or
other information, secured by an adverse party's counsel in the course
12. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to
Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 500 (1970) [Hereinafted cited as Proposed Amendments].
13. Since "Rule 34 require[d] a showing of 'good cause' for the production of all
documents and things, whether or not trial preparation is involved, courts . . . differed
over whether a showing of relevance and lack of privilege [was] enough or whether
more . . . [was needed]." Id.
14. Special Project, supra note 8, at 771.
15. Id. at 773.
16. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 498.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 499.
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of preparation for possible litigation after a claim has arisen." 23 Al-
though the United States Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals denying discovery, it did so on a differ-
ent basis. While the appellate court previously broadened the attorney-
client privilege2 4 in discovery proceedings, the Supreme Court instead
"created a new privilege to meet the situation opened up by the new
breath of discovery." 25
The Supreme Court declined to extend the attorney-client privi-
lege beyond its traditional boundaries. 26 The material being sought in
Hickman was not information disclosed by a client to his attorney, but
instead, was information gathered by the attorney from "a witness
while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation. 2 7 However, even
though the material sought was not privileged, in the traditional sense,
the Court nevertheless held discovery was not proper. Instead of adopt-
ing the traditional and absolute privilege, which would deny discovery
under all circumstances, the United States Supreme Court created a
qualified privilege which would generally bar discovery. However, it
left the possibility of work product discovery open where the need is
great enough.28
In Hickman, the United States Supreme Court recognized a dif-
ference between "written materials obtained or prepared by an adver-
sary's counsel with an eye toward litigation"29 and "oral statements
made by a witness to [the attorney], whether ... in the form of
mental impressions or memoranda.13 0 In making the distinction the
Court suggested that the written materials may more often be discover-
able than oral statements. Written materials were found to be discover-
able "[w]here relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an
attorney's file and where production of those facts is essential to the
23. Id. at 497.
24. The court of appeals recognized that the conventional attorney-client privi-
lege was not applicable because the materials in question were obtained by the attorney
from third parties, and not the client. Nevertheless, the court stated that the attorney-
client privilege should be broader in discovery proceedings than in the law of evidence
to exclude testimony. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 222 (3d Cir. 1945).
25. J. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.10, at 251 (1985).
26. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508.
27. Id.
28. J. HAZARD, supra note 25, at 252.
29. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
30. Id. at 512.
13011986]
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preparation of one's case." 3' 1 Other circumstances under which such
statements may be discoverable are found where the document is ad-
missible in evidence: 2 if it "give[s] clues as to the existence or location
of relevant facts . .. [if it is] useful for purposes of impeachment or
corroboration, [or if] the witnesses are no longer available or can be
reached only with difficulty." 33 However, the Court found that the dis-
coverability of oral statements would be justified only in a "rare situa-
tion."'3 4 The Court stated that if any attorney is forced to "repeat or
write out all that witnesses have told him . . . grave dangers of inaccu-
racy and untrustworthiness"3 5 would arise.
Although the Supreme Court noted that discovery rules were to be
accorded a "broad and liberal treatment",3 6 it stressed that "like all
matters of procedure, [discovery] has ultimate and necessary bounda-
ries."'3 7 Further, it noted that in applying this new qualified privilege to
limit discovery, various important policies are being furthered. First,
lawyers will be free to develop their theories, strategies, and approaches
without fear that the opposing party may gain access to same.38 The
Court states "[w]ere such materials open to opposing counsel on mere
demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain un-
written; .. . [t]he effect on the legal profession would be demoraliz-
ing." 9 Secondly, Hickman's policies serve to encourage individual re-
search and investigation, and discourage the use of an opponent's work
as a substitute for their own efforts.40 Finally, the Court believed that
the "interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly
served"41 by unrestricted discovery practices. Much litigation subse-
quent to the Hickman decision sought to further these policies in apply-
ing the new qualified rule.42 However, for over twenty years the matter
was left to the federal courts to decide on a case by case basis. 43
31. Id. at 511.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 513.
35. Id. at 512-513.
36. Id. at 507.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 511.
39. Id.
40. Proposed Amendments, supra note 12, at 501.
41. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
42. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 82 at 554 (1983).
43. Id. Many states enacted rules to solve some of the troublesome areas left by
6
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C. After Hickman - Rule 26(b)(3)44
Some of the post-Hickman problems were eliminated by certain
1980 Amendments to the Federal Rules. Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 26(b)(3) 4' partially codified 46 the Hickman decision. Rule
26(b)(3) extended the work product immunity to non-attorneys en-
gaged in trial preparation. 47 Additionally, the requirement of "good
cause" under the old federal rule was eliminated for one of relevance
and absence of privilege.48 However, the new rule explicitly required a
special showing for trial preparation materials. Therefore, where one
party attempts to obtain materials prepared in anticipation of litigation
by the opponent, the party seeking discovery must make a "showing of
substantial need. . . and an inability without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. ' 49 The re-
quired special showing before allowing discovery of materials prepared
in anticipation of litigation reflects the Federal Rules Advisory Com-
mittee's view that the informal evaluation and investigation of each
side should be protected thereby encouraging independent preparation
and avoiding one side relying and obtaining the benefit of the other
side's detailed preparatory work.50 Further, an even greater protection
is given to materials prepared by an attorney or other representative of
the client, which reflects their opinions, mental impressions, conclusions
or legal theories.51
Despite attempted clarification of the Hickman decision, Rule
the Hickman decision. See, 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 2022 at 189 n. 98 (1970 & Supp. 1985).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
45. Id.
46. Federal Rule 26(b)(3) did not completely codify the work product doctrine
set forth in Hickman v. Taylor. The standard of Hickman protected both "tangible"
and "intangible" work product. However, Rule 26(b)(3) only applies to "tangible"
work product. Rule 26(b)(3) expanded the standard of Hickman by explicitly ex-
tending the protection from discovery to materials prepared by non-attorneys. Also, it
set forth the showing which was required to overcome the immunity from discovery.
See Comment, Ambiguities After the 1970 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Relating to Discovery of Experts and Attorney's Work Product, 17 WAYNE
L. REv. 1145, 1158 (1971).
47. Proposed Amendments, supra note 12, at 502.
48. Id. at 500.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 501.
51. Special Project, supra note 8, at 784.
1986] 1303
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26(b)(3) left ambiguities 2 with which the courts must deal. One such
ambiguity arises in restricting its scope to materials "prepared in antic-
ipation of litigation." The explicit restriction in the rule adds emphasis
to the determination of when anticipation of litigation begins. 3 The
determination is difficult to ascertain in many cases where the investi-
gation following an occurrence may have multiple purposes.
In making the determination of whether or not the material should
be afforded work product protection it is important for the courts to
base their decision on the policy justifications of the work product doc-
trine. The central justification of the work product doctrine is to protect
a party's preparatory work from his adversary. Although open and lib-
eral discovery practices are promoted in our system, a party should not
be penalized for his promptness in investigating an accident. The U.S.
Supreme Court has reaffirmed the Hickman rationales in its most re-
cent decision of Upjohn Co. v. United States.4 In Upjohn, the Court
explicitly stated that the policies underlying the work product doctrine
furthered a "strong public policy."55
D. Florida's Rule 1.280(b)(2)
Florida's Rule 1.280(b)(2) 56 was enacted to conform with Federal
Rule 26(b)(3) . The latter codified 58 the principles of the work product
doctrine set forth in Hickman.59 An analysis of a work product claim
under Rule 1.280(b)(2) of the Florida Rules is bifurcated between a
determination of whether documents constitute work product, and if so,
whether the party seeking production is unable to obtain the substan-
tial equivalent of the document by other means.6 0
52. Ambiguities which are beyond the scope of this Note involve the standard of
protection to be given to oral statements and other intangible work product; whether
use of the material in subsequent litigation should be protected; and the ownership of
the work product immunity.
53. Special Project, supra note 8, at 784.
54. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
55. Id. at 398.
56. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(2).
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
58. See supra note 46.
59. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 495.
60. The focus of this Note is on the first issue under Rule 1.280(b)(2): whether
materials were prepared in anticipation of litigation. This Note does not discuss the
criteria required to show substantial need and undue hardship. The determination of
whether the material was prepared in anticipation of litigation does not affect the reso-
1304 [Vol. 10
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III. Florida Law
Presently, no Florida court has established a clear precedent on
the issue of the discoverability of prelitigation material. The existing
case law is composed of various confusing and conflicting decisions. Be-
cause the facts of each case are important for a proper application of
the work product protection, Florida cases will be examined to illus-
trate how similar cases are yielding different results.
Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nakutis,61 a Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal case addressing the issue of the discoverability of prelitigation ma-
terial, stands for the proposition that accident reports are prepared in
anticipation of litigation."2 Winn Dixie involves a slip and fall accident
at a grocery store. The plaintiff sought accident reports relating to the
same store for a number of years prior to his alleged injury.6e A discov-
ery order was entered and defendant sought review by way of writ of
certiorari.6 4 The plaintiff contended that the reports were prepared by
Winn Dixie or its agents in the ordinary course of business, and thus
discoverable. 5 The court dismissed this argument with the following
statement:
It is hardly arguable that an accident report of a slip and fall inci-
dent in a grocery store, prepared by the grocery store employees or
agents, is not a document prepared in anticipation of litigation.
Those reports certainly are not prepared because of some morbid
curiosity about how people fall at the market. Experience has
shown all retail stores that people who fall in their stores try to be
lution of the second issue under Florida Rule 1.280(b)(2) which concerns the showing
required for discovery of work product. See, 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2025 (1970 & Supp. 1985). Also beyond the scope of
this Note is the application of work product in the insurance bad faith context. For
information on this issue, see J. MCCARTHY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES
§ 3.71 (1983).
61. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nakutis, 435 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1983), rev. denied, 446 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1984).
62. See, e.g., Florida Cypress Gardens, Inc. v. Murphy, 471 So. 2d 203, 205
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Gonyea, 455 So. 2d 1342,
1344 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Walt Disney World Co. v. Cotto, 462 So. 2d 486
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Karch v. MacKay, 453 So. 2d 452, 453 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1984).
63. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nakutis, 435 So. 2d, 307, 308 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1983), rev. denied, 446 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1984).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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compensated for their injuries. Experience has also shown those
stores that bogus or frivolous or exaggerated claims might be
made. A potential defendant's right to fully investigate and memo-
rialize the results of the investigation should not be restricted any
more than should a potential plaintiff's. Our system of advocacy
and dispute settlement by trial mandates that each side should be
able to use its sources of investigation without fear of having to
disclose it all to its opponents. This allows for free discussion and
communication during preparation for litigation. If all reports and
other communications of the litigants were available to the opposi-
tion then those communications would certainly be stilted, un-
revealing and thus self-defeating in their purpose.66
The Second6 7 and Fifth"8 District Courts of Appeal have followed this
approach.
However, in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Mc-
Gann,69 the Fourth District Court of Appeal, also faced with a slip and
fall case at a supermarket, did not follow the Winn Dixie standard. The
court in reviewing the trial court's discovery order did not make the
presumption made by the court in Winn Dixie, that all accident reports
are prepared in anticipation of litigation. Instead, it found that the de-
fendant failed to make the required showing that the statements taken
by employees or agents of the store concerning the accident were pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation, and thus were not protected from
discovery. 70 This standard has been consistently followed in the Fourth
District Court of Appeals. 1
The Winn Dixie and McGann cases are a clear illustration of a
conflicting interpretation and application of the work product rule in
factually identical cases. The position taken by the court in Winn Dixie
seeks to protect a litigant's informal evaluation of his case and encour-
ages independent preparation for trial. Additionally, such a view pre-
vents one side from obtaining automatic access to the preparatory work
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Florida Cypress Gardens, Inc., 471 So. 2d at 203; Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc., 455 So. 2d at 1342; Nationwide Ins. Co., 276 So. 2d at 547.
68. See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 435 So. 2d at 307; Walt Disney World
Co., 462 So. 2d at 486.
69. 402 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
70. Id. at 1362.
71. E.g., Airocar, Inc. v. Goldman, 474 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. White, 447 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Surette v. Galiardo, 323 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
1306 [Vol. 10
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of the other side upon a simple showing of relevance, 2 which is the
standard required when the material is not considered work product.
However, one major criticism of the approach taken by Winn Dixie is
that it fails to consider that there may be circumstances where reports
are prepared for reasons other than litigation.73 For example, there are
situations where accident reports are prepared for reasons pertaining to
safety, public relations,7 4 or possibly in an attempt to amicably resolve
a claim. It is argued that a rule of thumb approach can foreclose such
considerations and may lead to an improper application of the work
product rule..
Other cases which have generated much confusion are those in-
volving insurance companies. Courts have failed to recognize that the
standards used in evaluating these cases must take into account the
nature of the insurance business. Unlike other businesses, an insurance
company's regular course of business is to investigate claims. Further-
more, courts often neglect to distinquish between the discoverability of
a liability insurer's investigation material and an insurer's investigation
material pertaining to a claim brought by its policyholder. The result is
confusing precedent which provides little predictability of the protec-
tion an insurance company may expect of its investigation material.
An example of a case involving an insurance company, which is
confusing and unclear as to its scope, is Cotton States Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Turtle Reef.76 The case involved an action by an insured
against its insurer. The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
statements and materials prepared by a party's investigator or insurer
are protected from discovery only when prepared in contemplation of
72. When the materials being sought are not privileged, Florida Rule
1.280(b)(1) requires, in addition to relevancy, that the information sought be "reasona-
bly calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence."
Rule 1.280(b)(1) states in part:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is
relevant to the subject matter of the pending action, whether it relates to
the claim or defense ... of any other party ... [and] is not ground for
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.
Id.
73. Spaulding v. Denton, 68 F.R.D. 342, 345 (D. Del. 1975).
74. 245 ACAD. FLA. TRIAL LAW J. 10 (February 1983).
75. Spaulding, 68 F.R.D. at 345.
76. 444 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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litigation.7 The court further explained that "mere likelihood of litiga-
tion does not satisfy this qualification. ' 78 The case was remanded to
determine if the investigation material was of the type insurance com-
panies conduct in the ordinary course of business, or whether the inves-
tigation file was prepared in anticipation of litigation.79
The decision is confusing as it suggests that documents prepared in
the ordinary course of business cannot also be prepared in anticipation
of litigation."0 An argument can be made that such an analysis over-
looks the possibility that in certain situations the ordinary course of
business is anticipation of legal claims.8" An insurance company's ordi-
nary course of business is to investigate accidents and claims. This does
not mean that such an investigation may not also be in anticipation of
legal action. Therefore, courts should arguably eliminate the ordinary
course of business exception8 2 when determining the discoverability of
insurance companies' files.
Another ambiguity created by the Cotton States case is whether
the standard set forth by the court extends to cases involving actions by
a third party against a liability insurer. In Florida Cypress Gardens v.
Murphy,8 3 a husband and wife brought an action for injuries the hus-
band suffered from an accident in which he was thrown out of a wheel-
chair at Cypress Gardens. 4 The Second District Court of Appeal re-
versed the trial court's order to produce the investigation file of Florida
Cypress Garden's liability insurer. The court refused to follow the Cot-
77. Id. at 596.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. The "ordinary course of business" exception is attributable to the statement
used by the Advisory Committee on the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
indicating that materials assembled in the ordinary course of business are considered
equivalent of materials not prepared in anticipation of litigation. Proposed Amend-
ments, supra note 12, at 501. Although this exception is not stated in the Federal Rule,
nor the Florida Rule on work product, some courts have used the rationale in deciding
whether the material should be protected from discovery. E.g. Thomas Organ Co. v.
Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367, 371 (N.D. I1l. 1972); Proctor & Gamble
Co. v. Swilley, 462 So. 2d 1188, 1193 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
81. See, e.g., Carver v. Allstate Ins. Co., 94 F.R.D. 131, 134 (S.D. Ga. 1982);
Fontaine v. Sunflower Beef Carrier, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 89, 92 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
82. Special Project, supra note 8, at 855. The Special Project proposes a com-
plete abandonment of the ordinary course of business exception. It suggests an analysis
of each case on its facts. Id.
83. 471 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
84. Id. at 204.
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ton States case and declared:
Without citing Florida law on the point, [Cotton States] relied on
two federal court interpretations of the comparable federal discov-
ery rule. With all due respect, we cannot accept the proposition
that the investigation file of an insurance company concerning an
accident involving its insured was not prepared in anticipation of
litigation simply because its contents may have been obtained prior
to the filing of a formal claim. 85
The court's analysis reflects a misinterpretation of the Cotton States
case. The court failed to factually distinguish Cotton States and Flor-
ida Cypress Gardens. Cotton States involved an action by an insured
against its insurer, while Florida Cypress Gardens involved a claim by
a third party injured at Cypress Garden against Cypress Gardens' lia-
bility insurer. Nothwithstanding the fact that in both cases the material
sought was prepared by or for the insurer, the primary purpose for the
investigation was different. In Cotton States, it is suggested that the
primary purpose of an insurer's investigation into its policyholder's
claim is to determine whether to honor the claim or resist it.86 Al-
though it is true that litigation may result from denial of a claim by an
insurer, this decision is reached after preliminary investigation not re-
lated to litigation."1 In Florida Cypress Gardens, the primary purpose
of the investigation was, arguably, anticipating some legal action by the
injured party, and thus the test of Cotton States was not applicable.88
However, the standard followed by the court in Florida Cypress
Gardens has been rejected by other courts in determining the exent of
protection a liability insurer's file should receive. Florida Cypress Gar-
dens followed the Winn-Dixie89 standard, which held that all investiga-
tive material gathered by a liability insurer is prepared in anticipation
of legal action. This standard was not followed by the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in Surette v. Galiardo,90 which involved an action
brought by the mother of a minor child who was struck and killed by a
school bus. In Surette, the plaintiff sought to obtain the accident report
85. Id. at 206.
86. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 444 So. 2d at 596.
87. E.g., Carver, 94 F.R.D. at 134.
88. Florida Cypress Gardens, 471 So. 2d at 206.
89. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nakutis, 435 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1983), rev. denied, 446 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1984).
90. Surette, 323 So. 2d at 53.
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prepared by the school board and submitted to its liability insurance
carrier."' Rather than make a presumption that the accident report was
privileged, the court required a showing that the report was submitted
to the insurer for use in connection with an anticipated settlement or
defense of a claim, before protecting the material from discovery.9 2
The interpretation of the work product rule is far from consistent.
While some courts make a presumption that witness statement and re-
ports are always taken in anticipation, of legal action,93 other courts
focus on the facts of each case before making the determination. 4 Ad-
ditionally, courts have not clearly distinguished actions brought by
third parties against a liability insurer from those brought by a policy-
holder against its insurer.9 5 This generates confusion among the lower
courts9" which tend to apply the same standard in both situations.
IV. The Law in Federal and State Courts Applying Work
Product Protection to Prelitigation Material
A. Federal Courts
State courts tend to follow federal court* decisions in the applica-
tion of work product protection to trial preparation material. However,
the federal courts offer equally conflicting and confusing precedent
which has not helped the state courts in resolving the anticipation of
litigation issue.9 7
There are various positions taken by the federal courts in applying
work product protection to trial preparation materials. One approach is
to hold that the material cannot be protected under the work product
theory unless the reports or statements reflect the employment of an
attorney. 98 This view directly contradicts the rule, which explicitly pro-
vides protection to documents prepared by or for a party's "attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer or agent." 99 Other federal courts
91. Id. at 57.
92. Id. at 58.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 61-68.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 76-88.
96. See Florida Cypress Gardens, 471 So. 2d at 203.
97. Fontaine, 87 F.R.D. at 89; Brown, 137 Ariz. at 327, 670 P.2d at 725.
98. E.g., Thomas Organ Co., 54 F.R.D. at 367; McDougall v. Dunn, 468 F.2d
468 (4th Cir. 1972).
99. FLA. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See, Fontaine, 87 F.R.D. at 92.
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have held that investigative material prepared by a company following
an occurrence is protected by the work product doctrine. 100 This test
"creat[es] a potential for abuse in the hands of companies seeking to
classify virtually everything in their files as work product."101 A differ-
ent standard adopted by federal courts is that enunciated by the Dela-
ware District Court in Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp.102 In Hercules,
the determination of the anticipation of litigation issue is made by ex-
amining the nature of the document and facts of the case.103 A similar
approach was followed in Spaulding v. Denton,10 4 where the United
States District Court stated: "Should any rule of thumb approach be-
come the general rule, it is not hard to imagine insurers mechanically
forming their practices so as to make all documents appear to be pre-
pared 'in anticipation of litigation'."10 5 Other federal courts have re-
quired the presence of specific claims prior to the preparation of the
documents in order to accord the material work product protection.106
Although the presence of a specific claim makes the determination of
the anticipation of litigation issue easier to resolve, it may frustrate the
policy of the work product rule which encourages complete trial
preparation.10 7
Furthermore, in Upjohn Co. v. United States,108 the U.S. Supreme
Court implied that it is not required that specific claims exist before
documents are protected from discovery. In Upjohn, the government
sought production of documents relating to an internal corporate inves-
tigation concerning unauthorized payments to foreign government offi-
100. E.g., Almaguer v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co., 55 F.R.D.
147 (D. Neb. 1972).
101. Note, Discovering Investigative Reports Under The Work Product Doc-
trine, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 156, 162 (1982); see also Spaulding, 68 F.R.D. at 342.
102. 434 F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977).
103. Id. at 151.
104. 68 F.R.D. at 342.
105. Id. at 345.
106. E.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 865
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Kent Corp. v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 612, 623-24 (5th Cir. 1976); Coastal
Corp. v. Duncan, 86 F.R.D. 514, 522 (D. Del. 1980); United States v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 627 (D.D.C. 1979); Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 64
F.R.D. 688, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
107. Note, Work Product Discovery: A Multifactor Approach to the Anticipa-
tion of Litigation Requirement in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), 66 IOWA
L. REV. 1277, 1297 (1981).
108. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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cials in order to secure government business.10 9 Notwithstanding the
fact that the company had conducted its investigation prior to the pres-
ence of a specific claim,110 the Supreme Court held that work product
immunity applied to the facts of Upjohn."' Therefore the case suggests
that materials can be prepared in anticipation of litigation although a
specific claim is not present.
Finally, some federal courts have attempted to solve the problem
by redefining the phrase "anticipation of litigation." For example, some
courts provide that there must be "some possibility"" 2 of litigation, an
"eye toward litigation""'  or "substantial probability" of "imminent"
litigation."' As one commentator put it, this does nothing more than
say that "litigation is anticipated when litigation is anticipated.""115
Thus, courts are free to choose among the wide variety of approaches
provided by the cases addressing this issue. The result is a lack of uni-
formity providing poor guidance for the state courts and confusion
among the federal courts.
B. State Supreme Courts
Various state supreme courts have addressed the issue of whether
witness statements and reports taken after the occurrence of an acci-
dent should be considered prepared in anticipation of litigation."' The
supreme courts in these states found it necessary to address the issue
due to the confusing and conflicting precedent in the lower courts.
However, the issue in these states is not completely resolved. The cases
decided often involved the discoverability of an insurance company's
investigation material. The issue is still unresolved as to the proper
109. Id. at 387-88.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 398-403.
112. E.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1979).
113. E.g., Sterling Drug Inc. v. Harris, 488 F. Supp. 1019, 1026 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); United States v. Bonnell, 483 F. Supp. 1070, 1078 (D. Minn. 1979).
114. E.g., Homes Ins. Co. v. Ballenger Corp., 74 F.R.D. 93, 101 (N.D. Ga.
1977); Miles v. Bell Helicopter Co., 385 F. Supp. 1029, 1033 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
115. Note, supra note 107, at 1278.
116. See Ex Parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d 1133 (Ala.
1980); Brown v. Superior Court In & For Maricopa Cy., 137 Ariz. 327, 670 P.2d 725
(1983); Hawkins v. District Court, 638 P.2d 1372 (Colo. 1982); Ashmead v. Harris,
336 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 1983); Henry Enterprises, Inc. v. Smith, 225 Kan. 615, 592
P.2d 915 (1979); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McAlpine, 120 R.I. 744, 391 A.2d 84
(1978).
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standard of protection to be accorded to materials prepared prior to
litigation by businesses other than insurance companies.
In those states ruling on the discoverability of investigative mate-
rial prepared by a liability insurer the trend is to accord them work
product protection. However, as to prelitigation material prepared by
an insurer responding to its insured's claim, the court holdings have
varied from state to state. The case of Fireman's Fund Insurance Com-
pany v. McAlpine" is an example of a situation where the investiga-
tion conducted by a liability insurer was found to be an investigation
conducted in anticipation of litigation. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court rejected the case by case approach noting that "it provides for no
uniformity in the manner in which the issue is resolved in the lower
tribunals."'1" Although a similar approach was taken by the Iowa Su-
preme Court in Ashmead v. Harris,"19 that court clearly stated that its
decision was limited to cases involving "routine investigation of an acci-
dent by a liability insurer."120 The court's language indicated that a
different test may well apply when it involves the "investigations initi-
ated to adjust the insured's own loss. ''121
In Brown v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa County,122 the
Arizona Supreme Court rejected a single test approach. It criticized, as
too broad, the approach taken by those courts which hold that "all
statements and information secured by insurance company after an oc-
currence . . . are made in anticipation of litigation."' 123 However, the
Brown case involved an action by various policyholders against their
insurer, and not one by a third party against a liability insurer. The
approach suggested by the Brown court is one which considers various
factors before determining whether to accord the material work prod-
uct protection. Those factors are: 1) the nature of the event that
prompted preparation of materials; 2) whether requested materials con-
tain legal analyses and opinions or purely factual contents; 3) whether
material was requested or prepared by a party or its representatives; 4)
whether the investigative material was routinely prepared; and 5)
whether specific claims or settlement negotiations existed at the time
117. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 120 R.I. at 744, 391 A.2d at 84; see also, Ex
Parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d at 1133.
118. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 120 R.I. at 753, 391 A.2d at 89.
119. Ashmead, 336 N.W.2d at 197.
120. Id. at 201.
121. Id.
122. Brown, 137 Ariz. at 327, 670 P.2d at 725.
123. Id. at 328, 670 P.2d at 726.
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the materials were prepared.124
However, in Hawkins v. District Court, Inc.,125 Colorado's Su-
preme Court also faced with a claim by an insured against his insurer,
adopted a different test in determining whether the material sought to
be discovered was work product. The test enunciated by the court was
whether the "document was prepared or obtained in order to defend a
specific claim . [and whether] a substantial probability of imminent
litigation. ."26 existed when the documents were prepared. Argua-
bly, this is an opinion which will give Colorado little guidance, and will
likely continue the inconsistent application of work product protection
in its lower courts.
It is evident that even the state supreme court holdings are not
completely uniform. Nevertheless, in those states where the supreme
court establishes a clear test, there is a precedent set for lower courts to
follow in applying work product protection to cases covered by the
scope of the opinion. Furthermore, insurance companies and other busi-
nesses conducting preliminary investigations in these states will know
with more certainty whether or not their work product will be freely
discoverable by the opponent in litigation. Unfortunately, the confusion
and misapplication of the work product rule in the lower courts of Flor-
ida will continue as long as the Florida Supreme Court continues to
deny review 27 of the anticipation of litigation issue.
V. Suggested Approaches to the Anticipation of Litigation
Issue
The anticipation of litigation issue requires application of different
standards of protection in order to encompass the variety of factual
situations which confront the courts. The following are proposed ap-
proaches to three distinguishable and frequently encountered
circumstances.
A. Materials Prepared by Liability Insurers
"There is little, if any, reason to question . . . that a routine inves-
124. Note, supra note 115, at 1287.
125. Hawkins, 638 P.2d at 1372.
126. Id. at 1379.
127. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Nakutis, 435 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1983), rev. denied, 446 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1984).
1314 [Vol. 10
18
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 11
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/11
Work Product
tigation by a liability insurer is conducted in anticipation of litiga-
tion." 128 Although it is possible that an action may be settled short of
litigation, there is always the possibility that a claim may result in legal
action. 2 " The fact that some cases are settled while others may never
result in a claim does not negate the fact that a liability insurer's initial
investigation is conducted to determine its insured's liability in the
event of lawsuit. With this in mind, it seems logical that the material
gathered by a liability insurer's investigation should be protected from
discovery.
The proposed approach will eliminate the "ordinary course of busi-
ness" exception. This frequently criticized exception'"0 is not an appro-
priate test to determine the protection insurance files merit since it
overlooks the possibility that a liability insurer's ordinary course of bus-
iness is anticipating legal claims. Finally, protecting a liability insurer's
files assures that routine investigations are thorough and effective,
thereby upholding the policy of Hickman v. Taylor.13' It should be
noted, however, that by adopting this approach the opponent may still
have access to the material, but only upon the proper showing of sub-
stantial need and undue hardship.1 32
B. Material Prepared by Insurer in Response to Insured's Loss
In contrast to the investigation conducted by a liability insurer, the
investigation conducted by an insurance company in response to a
claim brought by its policyholder presents a different situation. 13 An
insurer is under a contractual obligation to reimburse its insured, as-
suming the claim is a valid one. Accordingly, its primary purpose dur-
ing preliminary investigation is to determine whether its insured's claim
will be honored. Although it is possible that legal action may result
from a denial of a claim, this determination is reached only after an
insurance company decides not to honor a claim. Therefore, the proper
approach to take in determining which material should be given work
128. Comment, A Routine Investigation of an Accident By a Liability Insurer is
Conducted in Anticipation of Litigation within the Meaning of Iowa R. Civ. P. 122(c)
- Ashmead v. Harris (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1983), 33 DRAKE L. REV. 727, 734 (1983-84).
129. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 120 R.I. at 753-54, 391 A.2d at 89-90.
130. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
131. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 495.
132. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
133. Comment, supra note 128, at 732; see also Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 61 F.R.D. 115, 118 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
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product protection will require a temporal analysis. This test should be
one which ascertains the point at which the insurer's focus shifts from
investigating a claim for settlement purposes to an investigation in
preparation of litigation. An insurer's denial of a claim or some other
action indicating to the insured that the claim will not be honored to
the extent expected, is an indication of such change. From this point
forward, any material prepared by the insurer should be protected.
C. Material Prepared by a Business Other than an Insurance
Company
The material prepared by employees of a store, an employer, a
company's agents or other businesses not involving an insurance com-
pany may have multiple purposes besides litigation.3 As such, an ab-
solute rule would be inappropriate. The soundest approach for courts to
take is to consider each case on its facts. There are several factors
which may serve as guidelines for the court in making a determination
of the discoverability of these materials. First, the court must consider
the nature and magnitude of the event that prompted the investiga-
tion.' 3 5 The greater the degree of injury or loss the more likely it is that
a party conducted the investigation anticipating legal action. Second,
the content of the document being sought through discovery should be
analyzed. 36 For example, where a document contains legal analyses
and opinions a clearer showing that the material was prepared in antic-
ipation of litigation is made.13 7 Third, a determination must be made as
to who requested the investigation or prepared the document. 38 Al-
though it is not required that an attorney be involved before protection
is accorded, the presence of an attorney may be an important factor in
resolving the anticipation of litigation issue.'3 9 Finally, the court should
determine whether the materials were of the type that the business rou-
tinely prepared for reasons other than litigation.14 0
134. See supra text accompanying note 73.
135. Note, supra note 107, at 1287.
136. Id. "
137. Id. at 1289.
138. Id. at 1287.
139. Id. at 1292-93.
140. Id. at 1287.
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V. Conclusion
Proper application of Florida Rule 1.280(b)(2)"I will require clar-
ification of the anticipation of litigation issue. To date, the existing pre-
cedent is generating conflicting and unclear decisions.14 2 Such results
"undermine the predictability of work product decisions and the atmo-
sphere of security that predictability fosters."1 43
To provide uniformity in the application of work product protec-
tion throughout the state, the Florida Supreme Court must set stan-
dards which recognize the factual differences among the cases. In doing
so it is important to focus on the primary purpose of a business in con-
ducting an investigation following an accident. A logical and proper
application of work product protection will require that courts distin-
guish between cases involving third party actions against liability insur-
ers and those where insureds bring legal actions against their own in-
surer following the denial of a claim. As previously noted, the two have
different purposes in conducting an initial investigation. 44 Failure to
make a distinction may unduly penalize a liability insurer who dili-
gently and promptly investigated a potential claim while unfairly bene-
fitting a plaintiff who would be able to take advantage of the insurance
company's diligence. Therefore, courts must protect the preliminary in-
vestigation of a liability insurer. On the other hand, investigations con-
ducted by an insurer of its policyholder's claim requires a temporal
analysis to determine at which point the insurer's focus shifted from
evaluating the claim to preparing for litigation. As to cases involving
prelitigation material gathered by one other than an insurance com-
pany, an individual analysis of each case is necessary due to the multi-
ple purposes for which an investigation may have been conducted. Va-
rious factors are proposed as guidelines for the courts to follow in
analyzing the facts of the case.1 45
Once Florida courts establish clear standards, the application of
the work product rule will be more logical and consistent. Furthermore,
the suggested standards offer those who routinely investigate accidents
141. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(2).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 61-115.
143. Special Project, supra note 8, at 854.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 128-133.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 135-140.
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an accurate idea of when their investigative material will be protected
from discovery.
Maria del Carmen Dantes
22
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 11
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss3/11
